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In Whose Custody? Miranda, Emergency
Medical Care & Criminal Defendants
Kayley Berger*
“Respect for the rule of law in all its dimensions is critical to the fair administration of
justice, public order, and protection of fundamental freedoms.”1 The rule of law surrounding
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination will not be respected by the police or
public at large until major loopholes that allow the police “to take advantage of indigence in
the administration of justice”2 are closed. The major loophole this Note tackles is the “in
custody” requirement for Miranda warnings, which allows officers to question suspects without
providing them with a Miranda warning. Specifically, this Note focuses on the damage such
a loophole causes in the context of emergency medical care. It considers scenarios in which the
power dynamics are so severe the suspect involuntarily confesses to a crime. To close this specific
loophole, courts must expand what is considered “custodial” to represent the actual judicial
intent behind Miranda: protecting the disadvantaged from state coercion and abuse. This
conclusion is rooted in the judicial ideology that is used in the other Criminal Constitutional
Revolution cases, which all sought to protect against police tendency to take advantage of
indigence. This Note is not seeking to expand the rights of the accused. Rather, it is focused
on closing a loophole in an existing right.

* Kayley Berger is a J.D./M.B.A. Candidate at UC Irvine School of Law. Kayley would like to thank
Professor Leslie Culver for the mentorship and feedback Professor Culver provided throughout the
research and writing process. Kayley is also extremely grateful for the editing efforts of Catherine
Rosoff, Sumouni Basu, Chris Lawrence, Esther Lim, Priscilla Perez, Sophie Paeng, Nadia Blant, Alicia
Hernandez, Alice Doyle, and Christopher Su.
1. Elizabeth Andersen & Ted Piccone, The Meaning, Measuring, and Mattering of the Rule of
Law, 67 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 103, 103 (2019); see also JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 210 (1st ed. 1979),
(“F.A. Hayek has provided one of the clearest and most powerful formulations of the ideal of the rule
of law: ‘stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed
and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the
basis of this knowledge.’” (quoting FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944))).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966); see Thomas M. Riordan, Comment, Copping
an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney King Incident, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 676 (1994)
(“[D]espite apparent adherence to rule of law values, the current system has serious flaws that, if left
unaddressed, may lead to a breakdown of the legal order.”).
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“While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the
obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.”3
INTRODUCTION
“‘[O]ur contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’”4
The Criminal Constitutional Revolution5 was a major victory for the rule of
law. During this era, the Warren Court changed the criminal justice system through
a sequence of rulings designed to ensure the de jure rights in the U.S. Constitution
would be enjoyed in practice. Miranda v. Arizona was such a ruling, minimizing the
chance that ignorance could deprive someone of their right to remain silent.
This Note seeks to address a peculiarity in the subsequent interpretation of
the requirements of Miranda warnings. Specifically, Miranda warnings are only
necessary when a suspect is questioned while being held in police custody because
this is where the potential for police abuse and coercion is highest and when the
uninformed are most vulnerable to confusion as to the right to remain silent.6 But
interrogating a suspect who is receiving emergency medical treatment poses a
similar threat of abuse, coercion, and confusion; yet it often requires no Miranda
warning.7 This Note argues a warning is necessary in such a situation.
This Note proceeds in six Parts. Part I lays out the type of scenario this Note
seeks to prevent by utilizing State v. Clappes as a case study.8 Part I also identifies
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472.
4. Id. at 443 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
5. When this Note refers to the “Criminal Constitutional Revolution,” it is referring to the
period in which the Warren Court “extended new constitutional protections to criminal defendants in
state court.” Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364 n.14 (2004). Others may refer
to this period as the “Criminal Procedure Revolution.” See, e.g., id.
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–60.
7. See, e.g., Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding Miranda not required in
emergency medical-care interrogation when the primary purpose of the detention was medical).
8. 344 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1984).
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problematic questions the Clappes case raises in light of the Warren Court’s decision
in Miranda v. Arizona. Part II discusses the judicial intent behind the Warren Court’s
transformation of criminal procedure while paying particular attention to why
Miranda warnings were created. Part III makes the case for closing loopholes in
Miranda by analogy to the two-step interrogation procedure, another means of
eliciting incriminating testimony, which was found to contravene the intent of
Miranda and thus unconstitutional in Missouri v. Seibert.9 Part IV establishes
background on the right to emergency medical care, and Part V considers social
contexts in which that right might not be well understood or trusted, creating scope
for coercion and abuse. Part VI outlines a threefold solution that calls upon courts,
attorneys, and lawmakers to take actions that will protect the rights of individuals
who are receiving emergency medical care and are suspected of having committed
a crime.
I. THE SCENARIO: POLICE, EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE & SUSPICION
“[W]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”10
On May 20, 1980, at around 11:30 p.m., a deadly car accident occurred on
Highway E in Waupaca County, Wisconsin.11 When the car crashed, three people
were inside: One died while still in the vehicle, and one died after being thrown
from the vehicle.12 The last person, Douglas Clappes, was thrown from the vehicle
and suffered “lacerations, a ruptured bladder, a dislocated elbow, a fractured femur,
a fractured pelvis, and shock.”13 Despite Clappes’s clearly fragile condition and the
presence of several medical-care professionals,
[w]hile he was on the emergency room table and in shock, two police
officers questioned Clappes about the accident. They suspected Clappes
was the driver but did not advise him of his Miranda rights.
One of the officers [even] questioned Clappes in a loud voice. During
the questioning, Clappes identified the victims and admitted he was the
driver of the car. Clappes was charged with . . . two counts
of homicide . . . .14
To be clear, the officers questioned Clappes because they learned he was not
licensed and “suspected [he] was the driver.”15 This is evident as the officers asked
Clappes “[a]nd you were driving; is that right?” twice while standing over him and

9. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
11. State v. Clappes, 401 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Wis. 1987).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. State v. Clappes, No. 82-565-CR, 1983 WL 162143, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1983),
rev’d, 344 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1984).
15. Id.; see also Clappes, 344 N.W.2d at 142.
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speaking in a loud voice.16 Then, unsurprisingly, “[i]mmediately following this
questioning, the defendant was arrested and was issued a citation charging him with
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.”17
The Clappes case raises several questions because the police officers clearly
suspected Clappes committed a crime (which they ultimately suspected caused the
accident), questioned him about it, and obtained incriminating statements but did
not provide him with a Miranda warning.
First, why was Clappes not read his Miranda rights?18 Police are required to
give Miranda warnings any time a suspect is in custody, suspected to have
committed a crime, and interrogated.19 An interrogation consists of “words or
actions on the part of police officers” that police should know are “reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response.”20 And “for Fifth Amendment purposes, ‘police
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to
secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to
elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.’”21 For example, in People v. Bejasa, the
“defendant was asked questions such as, ‘[w]hat have you been drinking?’ and ‘[h]ow
much?’ These questions contrast strongly against general questions such as, ‘[w]ere
you involved in the accident?’”22 In the Clappes case, the defendant was on an
emergency room table when questioned about whether he had been drinking and
driving.23 The police did not need to ask those questions to secure their own safety
or the safety of the public. The officers had no need to fear for their own safety or
the safety of the public because not only were the officers no longer at the scene of
the accident, but the defendant was also on an emergency room table in shock. The
police were asking the defendant those questions to elicit incriminating statements.
As was the case in Bejasa, “[b]y the time [the police] contacted [the] defendant, [they]
had moved past investigation and into the realm of inculpation.”24
A suspect is in custody if a reasonable person in the same situation would not
feel free to terminate the interrogation and leave.25 However, courts have held “the
16. Clappes, 344 N.W.2d at 143.
17. Id.
18. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
or appointed.”).
19. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
20. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980).
21. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 658–59 (1984)).
22. 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 90 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing People v. Milham, 205 Cal. Rptr. 688, 692
(Ct. App. 1984) (“Unlike the questions in Milham, the questions posed to defendant were such that the
police should have known they would likely elicit an incriminating response.”).
23. State v. Clappes, 344 N.W.2d. 141, 142–43 (Wis. 1984).
24. Bejasa, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 90.
25. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254;
Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” at Hospital by Police
Officer Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be Informed of His or Her Federal
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bare fact of physical restraint does not itself invoke the Miranda protections.”26 This
distinction between being in custody and being physically restrained is especially
troublesome in the emergency medical-care scenario because it creates an often
hard-to-see distinction between the freedom to leave and the ability to leave. In the
ordinary course of a noncustodial interrogation, a suspect who wishes to end an
interrogation may ask, “Am I free to leave?” after which they can physically leave.
If they do not physically leave, a diligent investigator may continue pursuing a line
of questioning. Yet a suspect who is actively receiving medical treatment cannot
leave. Therefore, when such a person wishes to end an interview, that person ought
to have some verbal means to do so.27 They need to know they may refuse to speak
with police and still receive the best possible medical care. Without such a
protection, a zealous police officer’s questioning might interfere with the suspect’s
ability to understand their medical condition and treatment options and even
distract the health care workers. Even in cases where continued, unwanted
interrogation does not destructively interfere with medical treatment, a reasonable
person could have reason to fear that such interrogation could interfere; therefore,
the interrogation would be coercive.28
Miranda warnings are supposed to be provided to all suspects regardless of
their identity because it is virtually impossible for police to know which suspects do
and do not know their rights.29 The harsh reality is that although many people know

Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation—Suspect Hospital Patient, 30 A.L.R.6th 103, § 2
(2008) (“The determination of whether a suspect was in custody at the time of an interrogation requires
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and, given those circumstances,
whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was at liberty to terminate the questioning
interrogation and leave.”).
26. Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987). “The Court of Appeals . . . held that
ambulance attendant’s physical restraint of defendant, in order to examine him for injuries received in
automobile collision, at time police officer was questioning defendant did not constitute inherently
coercive environment which required Miranda warnings be given . . . .” Id. at 688; see also People
v. Mosley, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 331 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Our review of the facts of the instant case leads
us to the conclusion that defendant was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he was
being treated by paramedics in the ambulance prior to being transported to the hospital. Any restraint
of defendant’s freedom of action was caused by the need to treat his gunshot wound, which was still
bleeding and was actively being treated during the interview.”); Brown v. Yates, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1069,
1071–72 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (ruling no Miranda warning was required where Petitioner, who was
screaming in pain when dragged out of overturned vehicle by an officer, was questioned by the officer
at scene of crime while he waited for emergency medical care to arrive).
27. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only
when the person is guaranteed the right to ‘remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will.’” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); see also id. at 478–79
(“Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and . . . fully effective means [must
be] adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will
be scrupulously honored . . . .”).
28. See id. at 465 (“The abdication of the constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to
speak to the police—was not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of
his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the [arguably] in-custody interrogation, and not an independent
decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.”).
29. Id. at 468–69.
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their legal rights and that they have a right to emergency medical care, the intent
behind Miranda was to protect the most vulnerable in our society, many of whom
do not know these rights. Even harsher is the reality that some of the most
vulnerable in our society reasonably do not trust medical-care providers and believe
that the right to emergency care is illusory.30 In the emergency medical-care context,
the most vulnerable may be those who are undocumented, lack health insurance, or
are unsophisticated regarding public institutions (e.g., some do not understand the
difference between police and emergency medical technicians (EMTs)). In order to
protect the rights of these particularly vulnerable individuals, we need to protect the
rights of everyone under these circumstances. When the police approach someone
they suspect of committing a crime and question the suspect to elicit incriminating
statements, the police often have no way of knowing whether that suspect is
undocumented, uninsured, or unsophisticated regarding public institutions.
Therefore, the police should approach everyone as though they are undocumented,
uninsured, or unsophisticated in these settings.
A second question the Clappes case raises is why the justice system should care
about protecting the rights of individuals like Clappes. Well, in a country that
believes in the rule of law, the courts should worry about loopholes that cause a law
to have a discriminatory impact on America’s most vulnerable communities.31
Regardless of whether courts care about the particular defendant in a given scenario,
courts should care that police practices are not violating individual rights.
Moreover, the fact that these types of police tactics are commonly used on
suspects who are receiving emergency medical care constitutes a Fifth Amendment
violation that tramples on the right against self-incrimination.32 It disregards that

30. See Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 271,
280 (1992) (“[D]enials of even emergency care may not be infrequent. In addition to the difficulty
inherent in defining and applying the ‘emergency’ standard, some private hospitals also have refused to
treat undocumented persons who lack sufficient cash, regardless of their medical condition.”).
31. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58 (“The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is
at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled
to incriminate himself.”); Colin Miller, Cloning Miranda: Why Medical Miranda Supports the
Pre-Assertion of Criminal Miranda Rights, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 863, 887 (2015) (“The purpose, then, of
the Miranda warning is to ensure that the statements that a suspect makes in response to custodial
interrogation are the result of a free and rational waiver of his constitutional rights.”).
32. See, e.g., Bretton William Hake Kreifel, Comment, Paging Constitutional
Protections: Interrogating Vulnerable Suspects in Hospitals [People v. Sampson, 404 P.3d 273
(Colo. 2017)], 58 WASHBURN L.J. ONLINE 25, 25 (2018) (“In People v. Sampson, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that a police interrogation of a suspect while he was receiving medical treatment for a stab
wound in a hospital did not violate the suspect’s rights. In doing so, the Colorado Supreme Court
allowed police to continue to use arguably coercive interrogation techniques. This appears to run
counter to one of the goals of Miranda warnings, which is to ensure that statements made during an
interrogation are voluntary.”).
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the United States must value individual liberties in order to remain “the land of the
free and the home of the brave.”33
In response to these problems, we need to look for ways we can better protect
Fifth Amendment rights in these types of circumstances. “Miranda has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture.”34 The police can and should wait to question suspects
until after they are deemed stable by medical-care professionals and released from
the hospital. Alternatively, the police could provide these types of suspects with the
traditional Miranda warning the police are supposed to supply all suspects before
attempting to elicit incriminating statements. Or the police or first responders could
inform such suspects that their refusal to speak with the police will in no way impact
the quality of the care they receive. Any of these options would give a suspect
the chance to remain silent and preserve their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
II. JUDICIAL INTENT
“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to
the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods
of interrogation.”35
Because the actions of the courts, attorneys, and police can subvert the rule of
law,36 courts must look to the purpose under which each law was established. Thus,
the key reason why what happened to Clappes weakens the rule of law enshrined in
the Fifth Amendment is that it tolerates a practice—pressuring an ignorant,
disadvantaged person into self-incrimination—the Supreme Court specifically
intended to prevent.37
During the Criminal Constitutional Revolution, the Warren Court sought to
protect the have-nots38 and began to incorporate rights set forth in the Bill of Rights
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.39 This was a major triumph

33. FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER (1814); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at
460 (“[T]he privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our adversary system—is
founded on a complex of values.”).
34. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000).
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
36. RAZ, supra note 1, at 218 (“The discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be
allowed to pervert the law. Not only the courts but also the actions of the police and the prosecuting
authorities can subvert the law.” (emphasis omitted)).
37. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (recognizing how despicable police tactics in the United States
had become as police trade on a suspect’s “insecurity about himself or his surroundings” and “then
persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights”).
38. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103–04 (1974) (understanding that not everyone is familiar with the legal
system and questioning whether a “legal system [that is] formally neutral as between ‘haves’ and
‘have-nots’ may perpetuate and augment the advantages of the former”).
39. See Lain, supra note 5, at 1363–64 (“Together, these cases produced what is widely known
as the ‘criminal procedure revolution,’ so vast were the protections afforded to unpopular and politically

First to Printer_Berger .docx (Do Not Delete)

1204

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

4/27/21 6:18 AM

[Vol. 11:1197

for the Court in creating public policy. For instance, in 1961, Mapp v. Ohio
incorporated the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the states and ruled
that illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in a court of law.40 Then, in 1963,
Gideon v. Wainwright incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
trials for those unable to afford an attorney.41 Taking it one step further, in order to
protect the public policy they had already created, the Warren Court issued its
decision in Miranda v. Arizona and created a public policy absent constitutional
precedent.42 Post-Miranda, people not only had the rights afforded to them with the
Criminal Constitutional Revolution, but the police were also to inform them of all
of these rights prior to conducting an interrogation. The police were effectively
turned into publicity machines.43 Thus, the Warren Court in effect passed legislation
to protect the rights of criminal defendants and then reinforced those protections
in Miranda by using the police as their enforcement mechanism.
The very purpose of Miranda was, and is, to ensure police officers “afford
appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the
statements [are] truly the product of free choice.”44 Miranda is presumed and
deemed necessary regardless of the nature or severity of the offense any time a
suspect is in custody, accused of a crime, and interrogated.45 To determine whether
a suspect is in custody, the courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.46
However, it is important to remember “[t]he purpose of Miranda guides the
meaning of the word ‘custody,’ which refers to circumstances ‘that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’”47 The logic behind Miranda was
not that every suspect is actually ignorant of their rights but that police should treat
every suspect as though they are ignorant of their rights because some suspects are

powerless criminal defendants.”). These infamous incorporation cases include but are not limited to
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; and Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967).
40. 367 U.S. at 657.
41. 372 U.S. at 342–45.
42. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443 (“[O]ur contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but
of what may be.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910))).
43. R. Ben Brown, Professor of Legal Studies at University of California, Berkeley (Feb. 23,
2018). Professor Brown explained the police now have to recite Miranda when the requisite conditions
are present or risk any statements elicited being held inadmissible in a court of law. Thus, in essence,
this Note argues that the Warren Court’s decision in Miranda turned the police into publicity machines
of sorts.
44. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
45. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984).
46. People v. Boyer, 768 P.2d 610, 622 (Cal. 1989), abrogated by People v. Stansbury, 889 P.2d
588 (Cal. 1995); see also People v. Aguilera, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587, 593 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[Courts] look at
the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created
a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to
an arrest.”).
47. People v. Caro, 442 P.3d 316, 342 (Cal.) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09
(2012)), modified, 8 Cal. 5th 174a (2019), and cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 2682 (2020).
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ignorant, the potential for abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant.48
Similarly, not every suspect in need of immediate medical care will believe the police
might prevent that care; but, because some suspects are ignorant, the potential for
abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant, police ought to be required to treat
every suspect as though they might have this confusion.
III. FIXING LOOPHOLES IN MIRANDA
“The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal
Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”49
It is tempting to think of Miranda as a closed issue, but its interpretation has
evolved to keep up with police tactics.50 A clear example of this evolution is the
prohibition of the two-step interrogation procedure,51 which occurred
approximately thirty-eight years after the Miranda decision. Such an interrogation
occurs whenever police begin asking questions without a Miranda warning, learn
something incriminating, and then issue a Miranda warning and ask the suspect to
repeat whatever they said before the warning.52 While such a situation might arise
innocently, it might also arise as the result of a strategic police tactic to elicit
incriminating testimony police could not obtain if they were to initially Mirandize
the subject. This was precisely the case in Missouri v. Seibert, where Officer
“Hanrahan testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda warnings,
question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question until he got the
answer previously given.”53
In Seibert, the Supreme Court’s plurality decision condemned the use of
two-step interrogations as a strategic practice because, far from promoting the rule
of law, it relies on the ignorance of the suspect in order to trick them into
self-incrimination.54 This clearly violates the intent of Miranda which the court
recognized in Seibert.55 Interrogating a suspect who is receiving emergency medical
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (arguing that because “a warning is a clearcut fact,” it must be
given at the time of interrogation no matter the background of the person being interrogated).
49. Id. at 439.
50. See Hilarie Bass, Promoting the Rule of Law at Home and Abroad: The Role of the ABA, 90
N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Jan. 2018, at 12, 13 (“[T]he Rule of Law is a system of checks and balances that
needs constant and perpetual testing, nurturing and strengthening.”); see, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600, 611 (2004).
51. See Seibert, 542 U.S. 600.
52. United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2007); Seibert, 542 U.S. at
613 (“[T]he sensible underlying assumption is that with one confession in hand before the warnings,
the interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.”).
53. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600 (emphasis added).
54. See id. (“[B]ecause the midstream recitation of warnings after interrogation and unwarned
confession in this case could not comply with Miranda’s constitutional warning requirement, Seibert’s
postwarning statements are inadmissible.”).
55. Id. at 617 (finding that the officer’s actions not only challenged the comprehensibility but
also the “efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes
would not have understood them to convey” that they “retained a choice about continuing to talk”).
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care is entirely analogous. In the case of two-step interrogation, a suspect is
technically given a Miranda warning before repeating incriminating testimony; in
practice, however, the suspect is likely to be confused about whether they are really
protected because they have already made incriminating statements.56 Likewise, in
the case of an interrogation at the site of a medical emergency, the suspect is
technically not under arrest or in the legal custody of police; but in practice, the
suspect is likely to be confused about the consequences of noncooperation. In both
cases, the risk of police coercion and threats of harm—so fundamental to the Fifth
Amendment and once thought to have been eliminated by Miranda57—resurface.
IV. THE RIGHT TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE
“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves.”58
Although not every suspect in need of immediate medical care will believe that
the police might prevent that care, police ought to be required to treat every suspect
as though they might have this confusion because some suspects are ignorant, the
potential for abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant. Emergency medical
personnel are supposedly trained to treat all individuals in need of care, regardless
of identity and insurance coverage.59 This is enshrined in professional standards and
statutes. One such statute is the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), which “is a federal law that requires anyone coming to an emergency
department to be stabilized and treated, regardless of their insurance status or ability
to pay.”60 Focusing on the interaction between law enforcement and emergency
medical-care providers, professional standards have further committed to
protecting patients’ rights. The medical community confirmed its commitment to
this in The Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.7.4, which holds that “[t]reatment
56. See id. at 601 (“The manifest purpose of question-first is to get a confession the suspect
would not make if he understood his rights at the outset.”).
57. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and
integrity of its citizens. To maintain a ‘fair state-individual balance,’ to require the government ‘to
shoulder the entire load,’ to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth.” (citation omitted)).
58. Id. at 467.
59. Alicia Puglionesi, Americans Once Avoided the Hospital at All Costs—Until ERs Changed
That, HIST. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/americans-once-avoided-the-hospital-atall-costs-until-ers-changed-that [ https://perma.cc/9N5T-BQDD ] (“The emergency room is the only
type of medical facility in the U.S. where patients have a right to receive care, regardless of whether they
carry insurance or not.”).
60. EMTALA Fact Sheet, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/lifeas-a-physician/ethics--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/H6HP-6Z7Q] ( last visited
May 28, 2020 ).
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must never be conditional on a patient’s participation in an interrogation.”61
Furthermore, according to the American College of Emergency Physicians, “[l]aw
enforcement activities should not interfere with patient care.”62
Yet, “[d]espite these statutes and penalties, hospitals have continued turning
patients away.”63 The reality is that not everyone is aware of their right to emergency
medical care, and some of those who are aware of their right understand that it is
risky to pursue.64 Those who are aware know that “emergency” care is not well
defined and that they may be turned away due to the subjective decision of an EMT,
doctor, or nurse.65 Also, even if they are wrongfully denied care, most vulnerable
people (undocumented, uninsured, unsophisticated, etc.) do not have the resources
to bring a lawsuit;66 bringing a lawsuit may also lead to immigration consequences.67
Recent immigration crackdowns have raised the fears surrounding emergency
health care for undocumented individuals and their families.68 This becomes
problematic as
[t]raumatic injuries, such as gunshot wounds or motor vehicle crash
injuries, are conditions that attract both health care and law enforcement
responses. In these circumstances, clinicians and police share a mandate to
protect injured people and public safety. However, the police mission to
initiate an investigation and solve crimes may compete with the urgency of

61. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, at Op. 9.7.4 (2017), https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physician-participation-interrogation [ https://perma.cc/Z9W2-QW5Q ].
62. Law Enforcement Information Gathering in the Emergency Department, 56 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 80, 80 (2010), https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0196064410003872?
token=C19118763F63187D8019D023B5EC7E034B2C65EA7C33D660C14CDC18E86784962C37F
6902258D6C3D7827B92E0FCC001&originRegion=us-east-1&originCreation=20210406095357
[ https://perma.cc/D42B-Z3Z2 ].
63. Jeffrey Kahntroff & Rochelle Watson, Refusal of Emergency Care and Patient Dumping, 11
VIRTUAL MENTOR 49, 49 (2009) (“EMTALA’s inability to curb denial of treatment has been attributed
to the ambiguity of the statutory provisions, poor enforcement mechanisms, and divergent judicial
interpretations of the statutory provisions.”).
64. See Loue, supra note 30, at 297 (“An alien denied care on that basis would be forced to seek
care elsewhere and then litigate the issue of coverage by the relevant statute. Most undocumented aliens
would not pursue such litigation due to a fear of detection by the INS during the course of the
proceedings.”); Mary Gerisch, Health Care as a Human Right, 43 HUM. RTS., Aug. 1, 2018, at 2, 5
(“[O]ur country has long deluded us into believing insurance, not health, is our right.”).
65. See Kahntroff & Watson, supra note 63, at 50 (“The EMTALA requirement that emergency
personnel provide appropriate medical screening within the capability of the emergency department,
for example, can be interpreted under an objectively reasonable standard, subjective standard, or
burden-shifting standard.”).
66. Loue, supra note 30, at 312 (“The cost of litigation also may foreclose the possibility of a
private lawsuit.”).
67. Id. (“The affirmative undertaking of a lawsuit may raise fears of INS action at the
commencement of the suit or during its pendency, whether as the result of publicity or of unfriendly
phone calls to the INS advising the agency of the individual’s presence.”).
68. Rebecca Adams, Immigration Crackdown Raises Fears of Seeking Health Care, ROLL CALL
( Jan. 25, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/01/25/immigration-crackdown-raisesfears-of-seeking-health-care/ [ https://perma.cc/5GXC-RV5S ].
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emergency health care, which is built on protocol-driven systems for rapid
diagnosis, medical stabilization, and triage.69
Moreover, a police officer’s apparent authority over the scene of a crime or
investigation may lead an injured suspect to believe they have no choice but to
comply and incriminate themselves by answering the officer’s questions.70 A
reasonable person observing a police officer’s uniform, badge, holstered gun, and
command of individuals at the scene of the accident or in the emergency room
could conclude that the officer has some measure of authority over medical
personnel. Any doubt in such a matter must cut in favor of the defendant, who
depends on undelayed, uninterrupted, and unrestricted medical care to treat pain,
prevent complication, and save life. Justice Abrahamson acknowledges this issue in
her dissent in State v. Clappes, in which she argues that
[t]he mere presence of police, their appearance of authority, and perilous
surrounding circumstances which threaten the life of a helpless
individual—all of these in conjunction may pressure the individual and
force a statement. The police may not apply the pressure; but in appearance
they may still control the means of its release.71
V. WHOSE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD? THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A
“COLORBLIND”72 RULE OF LAW
“The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so
simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of
his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.”73
In the current jurisprudence on this topic, courts continually dismiss
defendants’ complaints that the incriminating statements they made while receiving
69. Sara F. Jacoby, Elinore J. Kaufman, Therese S. Richmond & Daniel N. Holena, When Health
Care and Law Enforcement Intersect in Trauma Care, What Rules Apply?, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180926.69826/full/
[ https://perma.cc/8S8T-P76T ].
70. See Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 403 (1960) (recognizing that what may appear “on their face [as]
merely words of request take on color from the officer’s uniform, badge, gun and demeanor”); see also
Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162 (1966) (“There
is authority in the approach of the police, and command in their tone. I can ignore the ordinary person,
but can I ignore the police?”).
71. 401 N.W.2d 759, 771 (Wis. 1987) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Clappes,
No. 84-2001-CR, 1985 WL 188241, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1985).
72. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 391–94 (2004) (admitting that medical professionals are not colorblind
and that “[m]odern medicine has embraced the use of race” because failure to do so is a mistake
as these professionals “no doubt will be influenced by the unconscious biases that plague
American society”).
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966).
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emergency medical care, without being Mirandized, are unconstitutionally elicited
and thus inadmissible in a court of law.74 In doing this, the courts overwhelmingly
argue that no Miranda warning is required in such situations because the
interrogations are not in fact custodial: the suspects are not in custody at the time
of questioning.75 However, the determination of whether a defendant is in custody
at the time of their interrogation is based on the totality of circumstances.76 The
determination asks whether or not a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
would feel free to terminate the conversation and leave.77 If the answer is no, the
interrogation is in fact custodial in nature.78
The reality in these emergency medical-care cases is that the identity of the
defendant matters because not everyone in the United States believes that a
medical-care professional has a duty to the patient to provide care.79 Dominant
groups80 likely take medical care for granted in the United States. Meanwhile, other

74. See, e.g., Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 1987) (“A reasonable person would
perceive this detention as imposed only for purposes of a medical examination, not a police
interrogation. Detention for a medical examination is not a situation that a reasonable person would
find inherently coercive in the sense required by Miranda.”); People v. Carbonaro, 23 N.Y.S.3d 525,
529 (App. Div. 2015) (“[D]efendant was not in custody when he was questioned by the same deputy in
the hospital trauma bay . . . .”); State v. Esser, 480 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (determining
that despite the fact that the defendant’s “injuries certainly limited his mobility and caused him distress,”
because “these conditions were not the result of any police conduct,” the questioning was not custodial
and thus the motion to suppress was properly denied).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 633 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The police posed
questions to [the defendant] and restricted his freedom of action, but only to the degree necessary to
investigate the crime. Their activities did not transform [his] hospital interview into a custodial
interrogation. As [his] statements were not made under custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were
not required, and the statements should not have been suppressed.”).
76. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Monique Tello, Racism and Discrimination in Health Care: Providers and Patients,
HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG ( July 9, 2020, 12:34 PM), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/racism-discrimination-health-care-providers-patients-2017011611015
[ https://perma.cc/P6ES-6H2S ] (“Doctors take an oath to treat all patients equally, and yet not all
patients are treated equally well.”); see also Austin Frakt, Bad Medicine: The Harm That Comes From
Racism, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT ( July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/upshot/badmedicine-the-harm-that-comes-from-racism.html [ https://perma.cc/93AR-EMD6 ] (“Put simply,
people of color receive less care — and often worse care — than white Americans. Reasons includes
[sic] lower rates of health coverage; communication barriers; and racial stereotyping based on false
beliefs.”); Aaron E. Carroll, Doctors and Racial Bias: Still a Long Way to Go, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/upshot/doctors-and-racial-bias-still-a-longway-to-go.html [ https://perma.cc/U3PF-YWY3 ] (“Of course, there’s the issue of mistrust on the
patient side. African-American patients have good reason to mistrust the health care system; the
infamous Tuskegee Study is just one example.”).
80. By “dominant groups,” this Note is referring to those individuals that are aware of and feel
entitled to unfettered access to health care. For example, those who are not uninsured, undocumented,
or green card holders. It also excludes those who have empirically or historically received subpar medical
care (e.g., African-American women).
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groups do not have such a luxury.81 This is especially true for minority patients who
become suspects as “[r]ace and ethnicity are consistently linked with different and
poorer patterns of health access and treatment.”82 The reality—something a court
should not pretend to be ignorant of—is that a reasonable person may be unsure as
to whether medical professionals will treat them with the same quality of care if they
refuse to answer an officer’s questions. Therefore, as Miranda was created to protect
the most vulnerable in our society,83 a reasonable person interacting with a law
enforcement officer while receiving emergency medical care may not feel free to
terminate the conversation and leave, meaning the interrogation should be deemed
custodial. Thus, at the very least, a Miranda warning should be provided to
the suspect.
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION
“The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most
needs counsel.”84
To work on closing this loophole, society must mobilize not only the courts
but also attorneys and lawmakers. Thus, the solution this Note proposes
is threefold.
A. Role of the Courts
There is no doubt that the courts could harness substantial power in working
to close this loophole. The courts should work to expand what is considered
“custodial” to represent the actual judicial intent behind Miranda and also to create
a version of Miranda that requires officers to explain to suspects that their
unwillingness to speak with police will in no way affect their medical treatment.
Courts have ruled on the side of equity in the past, only to be overruled by higher
courts that fear the implications of such equity. For example, in State v. Clappes, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the appeals court’s decision that the
defendant’s interrogation while receiving emergency medical care was custodial for
fear that it had “the effect of creating a per se rule prohibiting police questioning of

81. Khiara M. Bridges, Implicit Bias and Racial Disparities in Health Care, 43
HUM. RTS., Aug. 1, 2018, at 19, 19 (“Black people simply are not receiving the same quality of health
care that their white counterparts receive, and this second-rate health care is shortening their lives.”);
Robert Pearl, Why Health Care Is Different if You’re Black, Latino or Poor, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:59
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2015/03/05/healthcare-black-latino-poor/#58f982
467869 [ https://perma.cc/AWA4-H7JE ] (“African-Americans, Latinos and the economically
disadvantaged experience poorer health care access and lower quality of care than white Americans.
And in most measures, that gap is growing.”).
82. Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27
AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205 (2001).
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
84. Id. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369–70 (Cal. 1965)).
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individuals while they are undergoing medical treatment for injuries sustained while
engaging in potentially criminal activity.”85
Despite the reversal by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, courts should continue
to make these decisions in favor of equity and risk being overturned by higher
courts. If lower courts stop fighting for equity, the change will never come.
Meanwhile, intermediate and higher courts must consider what overturning a lower
court decision, as the court did in State v. Clappes, means for the rule of law. If the
law is being abused to coerce vulnerable suspects to make incriminating statements,
will it ever truly be respected? Will criminal justice institutions in the United States
be regarded as just and fair, especially by marginalized groups who are being judged
by a standard of reasonableness that does not fit their identity? To ensure fairness,
when someone is receiving emergency medical care, courts must require the police
to deliver a Miranda warning or some other type of instruction indicating that their
refusal to speak with police will not impede the quality of such care. Without such
an instruction, incriminating testimony must be inadmissible in a court of law.
B. Role of Attorneys
In addition to the courts, attorneys play an important role in closing this
loophole as “[m]embers of the Bar are guardians of the [r]ule of [l]aw.”86 If attorneys
do not continue to fight for their clients and make these arguments, the necessary
changes will never happen. Even if courts in a particular jurisdiction have not yet
barred statements obtained from medical emergency interrogations absent Miranda,
such interrogations violate the spirit of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Further,
defense attorneys have a duty to zealously defend their clients by moving to exclude
evidence obtained in this way.87 If attorneys keep bringing the fight to the courts
over and over again, it will eventually work.88

85. 401 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Wis. 1987).
86. Michael W. McKay, Defending and Upholding the Rule of Law, 52 LA. BAR J. 90, 90 (2004)
(“While others seek to tear down or limit the Rule of Law, our goal must be to strengthen and maintain
it. While others seek to act and profit while avoiding or limiting their responsibilities, we seek to
maintain and broaden access to our courts.”).
87. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer should
pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the
lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause
or endeavor.”).
88. It actually already has in rare circumstances; courts have suppressed evidence that was
obtained absent a Miranda warning from defendants interrogated while receiving emergency medical
care. See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 81 A.3d 360, 367 (Me. 2013) (affirming suppression of evidence where
defendant was hospitalized and questioned in her hospital room without Miranda even though she was
considered a suspect in a criminal case); United States v. Trejo-Islas, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078
(D. Utah 2002) (suppressing defendant’s statements made to an INS officer because defendant was
interrogated without Miranda while in a hospital bed and unable to leave, as defendant just underwent
an accident in which his vehicle rolled over several times).
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C. Role of Lawmakers
Legislatures also have an interest in protecting their communities’ rights
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and their respective state
constitutions.89 Although interpreting the law is primarily the responsibility of the
judiciary, when loopholes exist, legislatures need to pass clarifying legislation to
strengthen the rule of law set by the judiciary.90 Lawmakers should also work to
ensure defendants know their right to medical care is not dependent on their
willingness to speak with the police because “[i]njured people, themselves, are
rarely in a position to advocate for their own medical and legal needs during
emergency care.”91
CONCLUSION
“The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to
all individuals.”92
The rule of law only holds power if it is respected. In the case of interrogations
during emergency medical care with no Miranda warning, the rule of law is being
circumvented by overzealous police officers. When courts admit testimony
obtained this way by equivocating over the word “custody,” they trivialize the rule
of law by allowing decisions about life and liberty to rest on an imperceptible
difference between the ability to leave and the freedom to leave. Accordingly, belief
in the right against self-incrimination and a broader belief in the rule of law cannot
gain traction in marginalized communities until major loopholes that allow the
police “to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice” are closed.93
Therefore, the courts must expand what is considered “custodial” to represent the
actual judicial intent behind Miranda. This does not require the courts to expand the
rights of the accused; it requires them to close a loophole in an existing right.

89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90. The history of voting rights since the Fifteenth Amendment provides a clear example of the
legislature stepping in to fill the gaps courts create. Although the Fifteenth Amendment itself prohibits
the denial of suffrage based on race or color, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, a number of jurisdictions had
implemented voting requirements, such as literacy tests, that tended to primarily affect African
Americans. In Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld these literacy tests as constitutional, provided they were not used for discriminatory
purposes. This focus on intent left broad discretionary power in the hands of local officials, making it
nearly impossible to enforce the rule of law. Later, the legislature stepped in because the courts failed
to, and the tests were prohibited by Congress in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which also strengthened
the rule of law by subjecting changes in local voting requirements to court review for discriminatory
effects. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
91. Jacoby et al., supra note 69.
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
93. Id.

